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Obstacles to Accessing the State Justice
System in Rural Afghanistan
KARA JENSEN*
ABSTRACT
The United States' mission in Afghanistan is to create a stable,
democratic country that will no longer serve as a stronghold for terrorist
organizations. Since the U.S. takeover in 2001, most rule-of-law
promotion has focused on urban centers, allowing the Taliban to gain
traction in rural areas by creating its own alternative justice system.
This Note discusses the primary obstacles preventing citizens in rural
Afghanistan from accessing the state justice system and suggests
solutions to those obstacles.
INTRODUCTION
Most scholarship on rule of law promotion focuses on urban centers
while largely ignoring rural areas. This is an oversight, because rule of
law promoters face different obstacles to creating a rule of law culture in
rural areas than in urban centers. Overlooking the unique challenges to
rule of law promotion in rural areas can impede attempts to establish a
nationwide rule of law culture in developing nations. Nowhere is this
truer than in Afghanistan, where a historically wide gap between the
center and periphery, combined with a population distribution that is
three-quarters rural, makes the differences between rule of law
promotion in rural and urban areas particularly relevant.
This Note will examine the cultural, practical, and physical
obstacles to rural Afghans' access to the state justice system. It will
analyze and present solutions to the three primary obstacles to access:
low education levels among Afghan citizens, police, and the judiciary; a
pervasive cultural distrust of state institutions on the part of rural
Afghans stemming from historical and contemporary circumstance; and
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the dangers and difficulties that rural Afghans face in traveling to
centralized court locations.
Much of the work needed to dismantle these obstacles must be done
by the international community. While the international community has
been heavily involved in rebuilding Afghanistan's justice system, its
work has been disorganized, inefficient, at times counterproductive, and
mostly focused on the urban centers. Many of the recommendations
made in this Note focus on how donor countries can use their resources
more efficiently and effectively. Most important, though, is the need for
the international community to wrest its attention away from Kabul
and Kandahar and make a concerted effort to improve the court system
in the provinces, especially in light of reports that the Taliban has
begun operating Taliban courts in the absence of a functioning state
judicial system.' Through these courts, as well as through "redress
committees" where citizens can complain about Taliban behavior, the
Taliban is providing a model for fair and effective government in the
provinces. 2 The international community should not forget that the
Taliban's first rise to power was based on its ability to provide safety
and order for rural Afghans when the official state government proved
unable to do so.
In analyzing access to justice in rural Afghanistan, this Note will
not only discuss the court system, but also the police. The police are the
entry point to the state justice system for the victims of crimes, and
access to the police is just as important as access to the judiciary in a
country under the rule of law.3 Police reform without judicial reform can
be counterproductive, and the same can be said of judicial reform
without police reform.4 In Afghanistan, police reform and judicial reform
have been particularly fragmented, to the detriment of both areas. This
fragmentation is largely due to the lead nation framework established
by the international community as a means of dividing global
responsibility for the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Under the lead nation
framework, different nations undertook responsibility for police and
1. See Kim Barker, Letter from Kabul Solving Afghanistan's Problems, FOREIGN AFF.
(Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/letters-from/letter-from-kabul-solving-
afghanistans-problems (These courts have primarily been operating in areas where the state
justice system is inaccessible and corrupt, and the community dispute resolution systems have
been co-opted by local warlords.).
2. See id.
3. See Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31, 54 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
4. Id. at 55.
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judicial system reform, which has undermined the effectiveness of both
reform projects.5
This Note only briefly touches on statutory law reform because it
has less of a direct impact on rural Afghans' access to justice. Most
judges in rural Afghanistan do not look to statutory law while making
decisions, either because they do not have access to it or because they
are unfamiliar with the application of statutory law and highly
suspicious of it. Statutory law reform will not have an impact until the
justice system is reformed to ensure that the statutory law is applied.
Transitional justice systems in Afghanistan have taken a back seat
to political realities, as there is very little political will on the national
or international level to look into crimes that occurred during the
decades-long war that has ravaged Afghanistan.6 According to one
Afghan official, a serious effort to pursue transitional justice "could
implicate half the current cabinet."7 A participant in the United States
Institute of Peace's Afghanistan Working Group pointed out that for the
past twenty years "everybody who was exercising power was a war
criminal in one way or another because there wasn't any other way to
exercise power."8 Because no transitional justice systems are currently
in the works, this Note will not discuss transitional justice.
I. BACKGROUND
The events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated to the
international community that in our globalized modern world, the
failure of even one underdeveloped state could have security
implications for the rest of the world. The Taliban rose to power in
Afghanistan because it was the only group providing order and stability
in what was essentially an anarchic state following the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the subsequent failure of the Najibullah regime.9
United States' success in Afghanistan is therefore contingent not only
on a military victory over the Taliban, but also on the successful
establishment of a new, democratic government. A justice system is one
5. ANDREW WILDER, COPS OR ROBBERS?: THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM THE AFGHAN
NATIONAL POLICE, at x (2007), available at http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?
option=comdocman&Itemid=&task=docdownload&gid=523.
6. Id. at xi.
7. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 117, ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN
AFGHANISTAN 12 (2004) [hereinafter ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW].
8. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 105, UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN
AFGHANISTAN: WARLORDISM, RECONSTRUCTION, AND ETHNIC HARMONY 5 (2003)
[hereinafter WARLORDSIM].
9. See generally STEPHEN TANNER, AFGHANISTAN: A MILITARY HISTORY FROM
ALEXANDER THE GREAT TO THE FALL OF THE TALIBAN (2002).
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of the most essential building blocks of a successful, stable government.
Thus, the United States and its allies cannot win in Afghanistan
without making the creation of a functional justice system a priority.
A. The Bonn Agreement and Lead Nation Status
In December of 2001, representatives of industrialized nations and
members of the Afghan Diaspora met in Bonn, Germany, to plan for the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. The result of this conference was the
Bonn Agreement, which established the political structure of post-
Taliban Afghanistan.10 Donor countries agreed to take responsibility
(termed "lead nation" status) for different aspects of the rebuilding
process." The United States, along with the United Kingdom and
France, took responsibility for training the new national army; Italy
took responsibility for judicial reform; and Germany took responsibility
for police reform.12 However, the United States has since committed
itself extensively to most aspects of the rebuilding process; it is the
second largest donor to the justice sector and has also undertaken major
initiatives in the sector of police reform. 13
B. The Afghan Judicial System
The legal structure of the judicial system in Afghanistan is set out
in the 2004 Constitution, which affirmed the liberal 1964 Constitution
with few changes.14 Under the Constitution, the judiciary is an
independent branch headed by the Supreme Court, which administers
the lower courts and nominates candidates for judicial appointments,
whose nominations must be confirmed by the president.15 The Supreme
Court is also responsible for drawing up and implementing a budget for
10. See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5,
2001) [hereinafter Bonn Agreement], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/3f48f4754.html (providing for the establishment of the Afghan Interim Authority
and requiring that free and fair elections be held and a Constitutional Loya Jirga be
convened within specified time periods).
11. Faiz Ahmed, Note, Judicial Reform in Afghanistan: A Case Study in the New
Criminal Procedure Code, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 93, 100-01 (2005).
12. Id. at 101.
13. ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 11-12, 16.
14. J. Alexander Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan 5-6 (Ctr. on
Democracy, Dev. & the Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 19, 2004), available at http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/20714/ReestablishingtheJudiciaryinAfghanistan.pdf.
15. CONST. OF AFG. (2004) art. 132.
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the judiciary, in consultation with the government. 16 Under the
Supreme Court are the High Courts, which function as courts of appeal,
and under them are the Primary Courts.17 The Supreme Court also has
oversight authority to investigate abuse and corruption in the lower
courts.1 8 Although one of the duties of the Supreme Court is to assess
the constitutionality of all laws passed in Afghanistan, it has been
criticized for violating the substantive provisions of the Constitution. 9
Until recently, the Supreme Court was dominated by its very
conservative Chief Justice, Faisal Ahmad Shinwari. 20 In 2006, the
parliament rejected his reappointment by President Karzai, partially
due to concerns that Shinwari did not have the education required by
the Constitution to serve on the Supreme Court.21 Among the
controversial decisions made by the Court while Shinwari was the Chief
Justice were attempts to ban cable television, women singing on
television, and coeducation of male and female students, all without any
legal basis to do so. 22 The court was also criticized for appointing
unqualified judges in an attempt to politicize the judiciary. In 2003, the
court reported to Amnesty International that it had appointed 137
judges to the Supreme Court, when the size of the Supreme Court was
constitutionally limited to nine members. 23 In 2006, a number of more
moderate justices were appointed to the Supreme Court. Together with
the new Chief Justice, Abdul Salam Azimi, they made the court much
more moderate. 24 The new court has made attempts to reform and
institute standards and accountability in the lower courts. 25
C. The Customary Legal System
While the state justice system has a monopoly in urban regions, it
faces competition in villages and rural areas, where crimes and other
16. Id. art. 125.
17. Katherine McCullough, Out with the Old and in With the New: The Long Struggle
for Judicial Reform in Afghanistan, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 821, 825 (2006).
18. Amnesty Int'l, Afghanistan: Re-establishing the Rule of Law, AI Index: ASA
11/021/2003, at 21 (Aug. 14, 2003).
19. See Thier, supra note 14, at 1.
20. Id.
21. See Kim Barker, Op-Ed., At the Supreme Court, an Unlikely New Hero, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 21, 2007, at 5, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-
0701210351jan21,0,7944559.story.
22. See Thier, supra note 14, at 1.
23. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 12.
24. Ran Hirschl, The Theocratic Challenge to Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict
States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1179, 1205 (2008).
25. Barker, supra note 21.
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disputes are traditionally handled under tribal or customary law. 26
There is a history of conflict in Afghanistan between customary law, the
state legal system, and Shari'a law. 27 Rural Afghans have historically
resisted the imposition of outside laws by the central government,
regardless of whether the law was Shari'a law or the modern, Western-
style law that led to the revolts against King Amanullah in 1924 and
1928.28
Customary law is "the means by which local communities resolve
disputes .. . based on a common cultural and ethical code that generates
binding rules on its members."29 Under the customary legal system,
disputes are resolved by a jirga, a group of impartial men in the
community known for their wisdom and ability to make decisions.30 The
jirga seeks to resolve disputes through the use of mediation and
arbitration; its power of coercive enforcement is limited, but threats to
go to the state legal system are often used to force participants to abide
by the decisions of the jirga.31
Customary law in Afghanistan is not based on retributive justice in
the way that Western legal systems are, where the perpetrator of a
crime is sent to prison. Instead, it is based on restorative justice, where
the focus of the law is on making the victim whole and making the
offender publically accountable for his deeds. 2 Although unwritten, the
Pashtunwali is a type of common law system, and the guidelines for
26. Thomas J. Barfield, On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 17
CONN. J. INT'L L. 437, 440 (2002) [hereinafter Barfield, On Local Justice].
27. Thomas J. Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan,
60 ME. L. REV. 347, 351 (2008) [hereinafter Barfield, Culture and Custom].
28 Thomas J. Barfield, An Islamic State Is a State Run by Good Muslims: Religion as
a Way of Life and Not an Ideology in Afghanistan, in REMAKING MUSLIM POLITICS:
PLURALISM, CONTESTATION, DEMOCRATIZATION 213, 218-20 (Robert W. Hefner ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Barfield, A State Run by Good Muslims] ("i[Rural revolts against changes in
the legal status of women . . . would be decried as un-Islamic. But the same people
studiously ignored complaints by orthodox clergy that many of their own tribal
customs . .. violated shari'a law.").
29. Barfield, Culture and Custom, supra note 27, at 351. While each of the many
different ethnic groups in Afghanistan has their own customary legal codes, the most
common is the Pashtunwali, the Pashtun code of conduct. Id. at 352.
30. INT'L LEGAL FOUND., THE CUSTOMARY LAWS OF AFGHANISTAN 8 (2004), available at
http://www.theilf.org/reports/ILFCustomaryLawsofAfghanistan.pdf [hereinafter ILF
Report].
31. Christina Jones-Pauly & Neamat Nojumi, Balancing Relations Between Society
and State: Legal Steps Toward National Reconciliation and Reconstruction of Afghanistan,
52 AM. JUR. CoMP. L. 825, 839-40 (2004).
32. E.g., ILF Report, supra note 30, at 10; Barfield, Culture and Custom, supra note 27,
at 357.
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setting compensation and assessing property damages are highly
sophisticated. 33
In many countries where a state government developed while tribal
allegiances remained in place, there remains an uneasy truce between
customary law, which is usually unwritten and mediation-based, and
the law imposed by the new state government. Rwanda is one of the
best examples of a country in which state-based law and customary law
coexist. In Rwanda, the written Belgian law introduced during the
colonial period and the unwritten customary law have evolved parallel
to one another, and both continue to have significant force in Rwanda
today. 34 In the past few years, the United States has come to recognize
the importance of customary legal systems in rural Afghanistan, and
recent initiatives seek to take advantage of the stability of the
traditional justice system.35 Hopefully this will serve as the first step in
reconciling state-based law and customary law.
The customary legal systems in Afghanistan cannot be ignored by
rule of law promoters. Attempts to expand the court system into the
provinces must take into account the fact that it will not be filling a
vacuum but operating side-by-side with a dispute resolution system that
has been in place for a millennium. A cohesive and coordinating way of
reconciling the two systems, such as that in use in Rwanda, must be
developed in Afghanistan.
D. The Challenge of Warlordism
One of the foremost challenges facing Afghanistan today is the
presence of a multitude of independent, private armies controlled by
regional warlords. 36 The United States Institute for Peace defines a
warlord as "an individual who exercises a combination of military,
political, and economic power outside a constitutional or legal
framework."37 In Afghanistan, the most senior warlords will serve as
provincial governors or in other official positions, but they are not
33. See Barfield, Culture and Custom, supra note 27, at 356.
34. Laurel L. Rose, Women's Land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the Gap
Between Customary Land Law and Pending Land Legislation, 13 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 197,
203 (2004).
35. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN REGIONAL STABILIZATION
STRATEGY vi (2010).
36. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Report of the Independent Expert of the Commission on
Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, 6, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/370 (Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the
Independent Expert]; see also ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 15.
37. See WARLORDISM, supra note 8, at 3.
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accountable to the central government in Kabul.38 They pay for their
private armies through a combination of extortion and narcotics
smuggling.39
Coalition forces originally tried to work with the regional warlords
to defeat the Taliban and pursue al-Qaida, and they provided the
warlords with financial support.40 This gave the warlords time and
money, allowing them to reemerge as significant power brokers.41 The
private armies that resulted are now one of the greatest threats to
human rights in Afghanistan. 42 Most human rights violations and
crimes in Afghanistan are committed by militia members, who are
protected from prosecution because their commander is more powerful
than the local representatives of the state justice system.43 The police in
rural areas are often aligned with the local militia, so there is no state
force available to protect the populace from the ravages of the militias.44
As a result, most villages chose to undertake their own security
measures, often allying with several other villages in mutual defense
agreements. 45 Afghanistan will never be a rule of law society as long as
a multitude of armed groups roam the countryside, skirmishing with
each other over territory and border crossings, and co-opting state
institutions for their own benefit.
II. LACK OF EDUCATION
The lack of qualified personnel is an enormous problem for Afghan
reconstruction in general, but it is especially acute in the justice
system.46 Most judges are unqualified for their positions because they
have little to no legal education, 47 and literacy rates in the police force
correspond with the 28% literacy rate in the general population.48 The
lack of education makes training programs for both groups difficult.
38. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 15; McCollough, supra note
17, at 842.
39. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 15.
40. Id.; see also Report of the Independent Expert, supra note 36, 1 7.
41. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 15; Report of the Independent
Expert, supra note 36, T 7.
42. Report of the Independent Expert, supra note 36, 1 6.
43. Id.; FEINSTEIN INTL FAMINE CTR., HUMAN SECURITY AND LIVELIHOODS OF RURAL
AFGHANS, 2002-2003, at 50 (2004) [hereinafter FEINSTEIN], available at
https://wikis.uit.tufts.edulconfluence/display/FIC/Human+Security+and+Livelihoods+of+R
ural+Afghans.
44. FEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 51.
45. Id. at 49.
46. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 7.
47. See infra notes 49-51.
48. See infra note 67.
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Trainees often don't understand the basic concepts underlying a
civilian-based justice system, and training programs struggle to impart
these basic concepts while also providing practical skills-based training.
Finally, the lack of education in the general public means that many
members of the public are unaware of what resources the judicial
system has to offer or how to take advantage of these resources.
A. The Judiciary
Until recently, many members of the Supreme Court were not
qualified under the constitutional provision requiring that they "have
higher education in legal studies or in Islamic jurisprudence, and have
sufficient expertise and experience in the judicial system of
Afghanistan."4 9 The situation is the same in the lower courts. Under
Afghan law all judges must have a degree from the Faculty of Law or
the Faculty of Shari'a and have completed a one-year professional
training program.50 However, in 2007, only two-thirds of judges had a
secondary or legal education.5 ' The vast majority of judges with legal
education were trained only in Islamic law and had little or no
experience with statutory law or Western legal reasoning. 52
Judicial reform in Afghanistan has been marked by interagency
hostility and the lack of a cohesive strategy for reforming the justice
sector.53 While the need for both judicial training and higher legal
education is widely recognized, a lack of funding and vision means that
legal training programs have been limited, especially in comparison to
police training programs. 54 Most programs have been short-term, in-
service programs meant to train sitting judges.55 ,
The most prominent judicial training program was developed by M.
Cherif Bassiouni, a widely known expert on international law and
49. CONST. OF AFG. (2004) art. 118; see also Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 12;
KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21922, AFGHANISTAN, POLITICS,
ELECTIONS, AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 3 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/rowlRS21922.pdf.
50. SHEILA REED, CONNER FOLEY & HAMAYOUN HAMED, IDLO MONITORING AND
EVALUATION UNIT, IDLO ITALIAN FUNDED PROJECTS (2005-2008) FOR LEGAL AND JUDICIAL
REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN: EVALUATION REPORT 17 (2008), available at
http://www.idlo.int/DOCNEWS/277DOC1.pdf.
51. AsTRi SUHRKE & KAJA BORCHGREVINK, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM IN
AFGHANISTAN 220 (2008), available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/
CMIAfghanistan NegotiatingJusticeSectorRefrom.pdf.
52. Id.
53. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Islamic law, trained in Shari'a law, who has extensive experience in
training judges in Islamic countries. The Judicial Reform Commission
also runs a major training program that lasts nine months and has
trained hundreds of judges and prosecutors.56 A number of other
organizations have also developed training programs, but the programs
have been ad hoc and little effort at coordination has been made.57 Few
efforts have been made to rebuild the long-term legal education
infrastructure.58
A number of factors stand in the way of effective judicial training.
Many judges, especially senior judges, are resistant to new techniques
and are opposed to statutory law; they frequently express the opinion
that all relevant law comes from the Koran.59 Judges also have vastly
different levels of education and experience, which makes uniform
training programs difficult to administer.60 Most judges have no
experience in producing written opinions, are unfamiliar with having
defense attorneys in their courtrooms, and are used to making decisions
without reference to the statutory law.61 The basic idea that judges
should make decisions based on the law is the key concept imparted in
most training programs. 62 Finally, the programs suffer from a lack of
trained interpreters familiar with legal language, which is often
complex and difficult to translate.63
One of the primary problems facing judicial training programs in
Afghanistan is a lack of cohesiveness. Immediate reforms should focus
on improving coordination and communication between the multitudes
of different organizations providing training to judges. In order to do
this, a centralized institution for judicial training should be created.
This organization would provide the many groups administering
programs the opportunity to coordinate those programs. This would
prevent programs from overlapping and allow donor money to be used
more efficiently. Such an organization would also be able to provide
information about all of the judicial training programs to judges and
other legal professionals, making it easier for judges to find a training
program that meets their needs.
Donor countries should also begin to focus more heavily on long-
term solutions to the dearth of legal professionals in Afghanistan by
56. See id. at 10; McCullough, supra note 17, at 838 n.160.
57. REED ET AL., supra note 50, at 17.
58. ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 9.
59. McCullough, supra note 17, at 839.
60. See id.
61. ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 10.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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providing aid to legal education and law schools. Improving legal
education in a post-conflict country is an extremely important and often
overlooked part of rule of law operations. Because currently sitting
judges are often not interested in reform, the best hope for judicial
reform is in the next generation of legal professionals.64 The decades of
war were extremely destructive to Afghanistan's primary legal
educational institution at Kabul University.65 Donor aid is needed to
rebuild the institutional capacity of the law school, and the assistance of
the international community of law professors is needed to update the
curriculum.
B. The Police
Although the international community has spent over $10 billion on
police assistance programs, the Afghan National Police remain "the
weak link in the security chain."6 6 One of the primary challenges facing
the police force is low education levels and lack of training. Most police
officers are either illiterate or semi-literate.67 The inability to read and
write makes it difficult for the police to perform basic police tasks such
as writing incident reports, taking statements, and maintaining
records.68 Low literacy rates have also diminished the effectiveness of
the training programs created by the United States and Germany
because participants have trouble learning and retaining information.69
Until 2005, police training was the primary focus of police reform
efforts.70 In August of 2002, Germany, the "lead nation" for police
reform, opened a rebuilt Kabul Police Academy.7' The Academy offered
two primary courses, one meant to provide a university-level education
for commissioned officers and a shorter course meant to provide basic
training for noncommissioned officers. 72 The Academy also offered
64. See Richard Sannerholm, Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post-
Conflict Societies: Beyond the Rule of Law Template, 12 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 65, 83
(2007).
65. See McCullough, supra note 17, at 840.
66. See ROBERT M. PERITO, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 227,
AFGHANISTAN'S POLICE: THE WEAK LINK IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 1-2 (2009).
67. Id. at 3-4. Approximately 70-90% of the men in Afghanistan's police force in 2002
were illiterate, which is consistent with Afghanistan's national literacy rate of 28%.
However, in the provinces, illiteracy might be even worse. For example, of the 887
graduates of the Regional Training Center in Kunduz between January and November of
2006, only seven were literate. See WILDER, supra note 5, at 30.
68. WILDER, supra note 5, at viii; PERITO, supra note 66, at 4.
69. WILDER, supra note 5, at viii; PERITO, supra note 66, at 4.
70. WILDER, supra note 5, at 29.
71. PERITO, supra note 66, at 3.
72. Id.; WILDER, supra note 5, at 29.
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several shorter courses on specific subjects, such as counter-narcotics. 3
While of high quality, the program was incapable of meeting the Interim
Authority's goal of 70,000 officers in a timely manner.74 To fill the gap,
the United States created a separate program to provide two to eight-
week training sessions to currently serving police officers and fresh
recruits.75 The first training center was in Kabul, but soon after, seven
Regional Training Centers ("RTCs") were opened to provide training to
police in the provinces.76 Although the U.S. program trained over 70,000
policemen by July 2007, the quality of the training received is
questionable.77 Training periods were usually only a few weeks long,
with no follow-up training, so trainees did not have time to absorb
policing ethics from their supervisors, and they were promptly returned
to their districts, where they were under the command of untrained and
corrupt superiors.78 Also, little attention was paid to who was recruited
and trained for police positions, and there was no effort made to ensure
that Taliban and militia members were not recruited and trained.79
In 2005, responsibility for the U.S. police assistance program was
transferred from the Department of State to the Department of Defense.
In the first two years after the move, there was little improvement in
the training programs.80 However, in 2007, the U.S. launched a new
training initiative called Focused District Development (FDD) under
which all uniformed police in a single district were trained at the same
time as a unit and placed under the supervision of a U.S. mentoring
team when redeployed to their district.81 This training seems to have
been more successful, as the mentoring teams were able to evaluate the
unit on a variety of competencies and only pull out after it was clear
that the unit was functioning professionally. 82 However, the training
cycles took significantly longer than originally projected, and there were
severe personnel shortages.83 The major drawback of the FDD, however,
was that it was administered by the U.S. military and, as a result, focused
primarily on military tactics, weapons use, and counterinsurgency
73. WILDER, supra note 5, at 29.
74. PERITO, supra note 66, at 4.
75. Id.
76. WILDER, supra note 5, at 29.
77. PERITO, supra note 66, at 4.
78. Id.
79. WILDER, supra note 5, at 31.
80. PERITO, supra note 66, at 5.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id.
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operations, with only one week of the eight-week course spent on basic
police skills.8
Two relatively simple changes could make a significant difference in
the effectiveness of police training programs. First, while the FDD
mentorship program addressed many of the problems in early programs,
the focus of the program needs to shift away from military skills and
toward basic police skills, while also providing advanced training in the
areas most relevant for each district. For example, a unit in a district
near the border might receive advanced training in counternarcotics,
while a unit in Kabul might receive advanced training in crowd control.
Second, vetting procedures, such as cross-checking trainees' names
against known terrorists and militia members, should be implemented
to keep Taliban and militia members out of the police and the training
programs. This is a major problem for Afghanistan's police force; the
fact that many police are also affiliated with independent armies is a
major reason why many Afghans do not trust the police. There are also
military reasons for denying Taliban and militia members access to
training programs: most programs provide uniforms and equipment to
the participants, so by allowing members of other armed groups into
training programs, donors are actually arming Afghanistan's
independent militias.8 5
C. The General Population
Poor education and illiteracy in the rural Afghan population as a
whole is also problematic for Afghans trying to avail themselves of the
justice system. Illiteracy potentially deters people from using the state
justice system, which is based on written law. The customary legal
system, which is based on a widely understood oral tradition, is
probably less intimidating for illiterate Afghans. A great deal of foreign
aid is already being spent to improve the educational system in
Afghanistan, but very little effort is being made to address the
difficulties of illiterate court users. Part of justice sector reform should
include an effort to make courthouses friendlier to illiterate Afghans by
providing the opportunity to file claims orally and by making sure that
all of the court's communication with the parties in legal cases occurs
through both oral and written mediums.
Initiatives to educate rural Afghans about their legal rights should
also be broadly implemented in the provinces. Most rural Afghans are
not very aware of the existence of statutory Afghan law, much less its
84. Id. at 5.
85. See id. at 4.
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substantive provisions,86 so they have no idea if the judge deciding their
case is applying the law or something very different. If Afghans were
more knowledgeable about the law, they would have a better idea of
whether or not judges were applying it, and thus provide valuable
community oversight of the judicial officers in their district. Greater
knowledge of their legal rights would also highlight the differences
between Afghan statutory law and customary law, giving rural Afghans
the choice to apply to the state courts if the two are in conflict.
III. DISTRUST OF STATE INSTITUTIONS
There is a deep distrust of state institutions in rural Afghanistan
that has its roots in historic conflict as well as in current circumstances.
This distrust is well founded, since corruption pervades both the police
force and the judiciary. Further decreasing trust in state institutions is
the police's and judiciary's subservience to powerful local warlords and
commanders, whose approval they need to remain in their positions. As
a result, members of local militia commit crimes with impunity. State
institutions must be made worthy of trust in order to become relevant in
rural Afghanistan.
A. Historical Distrust
A perhaps apocryphal story recounts the response of an elderly
tribesman to an argument in favor of a strong government: '"We are
content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with
blood,' . . . but 'we will never be content with a master."'87 This
statement exemplifies rural Afghans' historic distrust, dislike, and
disinterest in state institutions, including state justice systems. Many
Afghans do not accept basic rule of law concepts such as the idea that
the state has exclusive control over criminal matters.88 Many areas of
Afghanistan have operated without formal government institutions for a
long time and have developed their own methods of dispute resolution.89
For many in rural Afghanistan, the right and responsibility for justice
resides in the person wronged or their family or tribe, not within the
state. As a result, actions taken by the state system are not considered
to be dispensing justice.90 Therefore, rural Afghans see punishments
86. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 5.
87. TANNER, supra note 9, at 133-34 (reported by British official Mountstuart
Elphinstone while leading a mission to Afghanistan in 1809).
88. Barfield, Culture and Custom, supra note 27, at 348.
89. Id.
90. Barfield, On Local Justice, supra note 26, at 439.
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imposed by the state as either inadequate, in that a settlement between
the parties will have to be reached even if the perpetrator has been
punished under the state system, or inappropriate because if the parties
have already reached a settlement there is no need for the state to get
involved.91
Central governments in Kabul have tried to impose statute-based
law on rural Afghanistan for at least a century, and they have always
been met with resistance, regardless of their ideological basis. 92 In the
1920s, King Amanullah attempted to modernize Afghanistan by
promulgating new codes that improved the status of women and made
education widely available, but resistance to these reforms forced him
into exile in 1929.93 When the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
took power and tried to institute socialist reforms, including land reform
and equality for women, the resistance forced the Soviet Union to
invade in order to keep the government from collapsing.94 However,
Afghans have not only resisted liberal reforms. Popular response to the
Coalition invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was to ask for a larger
international force to provide greater security, not to rise up in support
of the Taliban.95 This was because the social and religious policies that
the Taliban forced on the country were unpopular in both urban and
rural Afghanistan.96 Although in many ways the Taliban policies
represented a fusion of traditional customary law and Shari'a law, they
also introduced many policies foreign to Afghanistan, such as beard
codes and bans on all forms of entertainment, which undermined their
legitimacy among rural Afghans.97 Rural Afghans are content with their
own customary dispute resolution methods and see attempts at state
control as unnecessary, corrupt, and oppressive.98
B. Current Circumstances Generate Distrust of State Institutions
Much of rural Afghanistan's distrust of state institutions is not
historic, but stems from the fact that the state system is largely corrupt.
State officials operating outside of the capital or other large cities are
often under the control of local power brokers. This undermines perhaps
91. Id. at 440.
92. See Barfield, Culture and Custom, supra note 27, at 348-49.
93. Id. at 349.
94. Id.
95. Thomas J. Barfield, Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan, 37
IRANIAN STUD. 263, 289 (2004).
96. Barfield, A State Run by Good Muslims, supra note 28, at 232.
97. See id.
98. See Barfield, Culture and Custom, supra note 27, at 361.
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the most important tenet of the rule of law, that "the government is
imbedded in a comprehensive legal framework," and government
officials understand that "the law will be applied to their own
conduct."99 Judges assigned to the provinces report that they are only
able to perform their duties if they remain in favor with the local
commanders.100 The same pressures are also exerted on prosecutors. 01
Most of the men serving as police owe their allegiance to local warlords
and commanders, rather than to the central government. 102
1. Police Inefficiency and Corruption
The armed groups that rove the countryside are responsible for
many of the violent crimes committed against rural Afghans. 03 Crimes
committed by these groups tend to be outside the authority of the
customary justice system, which operates primarily as a system of
mediation and depends on the parties being susceptible to community
pressure. With the state justice system co-opted by the commanders,
this means that armed groups have essentially free reign to terrorize
the populace. Even police not aligned with armed groups cannot act
against them, because they cannot provide for their own security.104
Police admit that they will often know who is responsible for a crime,
but be unable to arrest them because they are a member of an armed
group.05 As a result, most Afghans do not feel there is any point in
reporting crimes to the police.106
The police are widely viewed as ineffective, and distrust of the police
is pervasive throughout Afghanistan for good reason, particularly in
rural areas.107 Because of low and intermittent pay, the police turn to
the people they are supposed to be protecting to supplement their
income. 08 Many Afghans report that the police operate on an "arrest,
bribe, [and] release basis,"09 and a study of rural Afghan women found
that the few women who were aware of a nearby police presence only
knew about it because the police had arrested one of their male
99. Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 3, at 3, 4.
100. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 7.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 10.
103. See FEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 50.
104. Id. at 51.
105. Id. at 50.
106. Id.
107. WILDER, supra note 5, at 1.
108. See FEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 53-54.
109. WILDER, supra note 5, at 1.
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relatives.1 0 Police operate illegal roadblocks in order to extort money
from truck drivers,"' significantly increasing the costs of transportation
and also the costs of any goods that must be transported. Finally,
Human Rights Watch has documented direct police involvement in
serious crimes such as home invasion, kidnapping, and rape.112 Police
have become a major cause of insecurity in Afghanistan, rather than
security.113
2. Corruption in the Judiciary
Corruption is also pervasive in the judiciary, undermining Afghan
trust in the state court system. Salaries are as low as thirty-six dollars
per month and are paid intermittently, especially to judges operating in
rural areas.114 There are reports that judges and prosecutors routinely
ask defendants or their families for money in exchange for release from
prison and accept bribes in exchange for not proceeding with specific
cases." 5 The Supreme Court does not seem to be effectively exercising
its oversight authority over the lower courts, given the widespread
reports of abuse and the relatively small number of proven cases." 6
Amnesty International suggests that this is because the Supreme
Court's oversight duty conflicts with its duty to nominate candidates for
judicial positions.117
In addressing the problem of corruption in the police and the
judiciary, it is essential to keep in mind that there are two separate
problems that must be addressed: the corruption itself and the public
distrust of those institutions stemming from the corruption. Therefore,
anticorruption methods have a dual purpose: to stop the corruption and
to ensure that the people see the government making credible attempts
to solve the problem." 8
Low and intermittent salaries are a major cause of corruption in the
Afghan judiciary, and the government must make regular payment and
110. See FEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 55.
111. Report of the Independent Expert, supra note 36, 1 28.
112. See FEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 54 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "KILLING YOU
IS A VERY EASY THING FOR Us": HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SOUTHEAST AFGHANISTAN
(2003)).
113. See WILDER, supra note 5, at 1.
114. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 7.
115. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 19.
116. See id. at 21.
117. Id. at 21-22.
118. See Madalene O'Donnell, Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?, in CIVIL WAR AND
THE RULE OF LAW: SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS 225, 227 (Agnes Hurwitz &
Reyko Huang eds., 2008).
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increased salaries a key priority for both the police and the judiciary.
The country will never be able to gain control over issues such as
narcotics smuggling as long as the personnel responsible for
enforcement are unpaid or underpaid. However, simply increasing pay
is not enough. The results of anticorruption programs in a number of
countries show that while providing a dignified wage to public
employees is essential, once an atmosphere of corruption pervades the
agency, simply raising wages will not solve the problem.119 Therefore,
wage increases should be combined with programs that monitor the
performance of public servants.120
An effective monitoring system would address many of the other
problems undermining public confidence in the state justice system. For
example, a monitoring system set up to tackle corruption in the courts
could also monitor whether the judges are correctly applying the law.
The monitoring system could also check whether noneconomic
corruption by local warlords is occurring and could transfer judges and
police officers who appear to have been co-opted. Finally, a monitoring
system could monitor for security abuses by police officers, such as
"arrest, bribe, [and] release" schemes and crimes committed by the
police.
Since much of the corruption stems from police and judicial cooption
by local powerbrokers, monitors should rotate among different courts in
different areas of the country, with no monitor spending more than a
few weeks in any one location. Not only would this allow a small
number of monitors to supervise courts and police offices throughout the
country, but it also would prevent cooption of the monitors by local
forces.
IV. DIFFICULTY OF TRAVELING
The state judicial system in Afghanistan is mostly concentrated in
major urban centers. 121 In the provinces, there are very few courthouses
outside of the provincial capitals.122 This means that Afghans in villages
must travel in order to access the state justice system.123 However,
travel and communication remain difficult in Afghanistan's provinces.
119. See id. at 239.
120. Id. (citing Juan Domingo Per6n's observation: "People are good. But if you monitor
them, they are better").
121. See McCullough, supra note 17, at 831; Ahmed, supra note 11, at 126.
122. JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 245 (2006).
123. See McCullough, supra note 17, at 831.
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Almost seventy-five percent of roads are unpaved 24 and over two
decades of war waged over Afghan soil has left unexploded landmines
littering the countryside. In addition, local bandits, police, and warlords
have set up numerous "toll stations" on major roads, making travel
dangerous and expensive. All of these factors make physical access to
state justice systems more difficult.
Landmines are a consistent threat to security in rural
Afghanistan. 125 Many rural Afghans are forced to severely constrain
their movements to avoid unexploded mines. 126 Although the greatest
effect of the landmines is in restricting access to pasture, landmines also
restrict access to vital community resources, such as schools, clinics, and
courts. 127 Afghan civilians must weigh the need to travel against the
danger from landmines. 128 Given these dangers, it is unsurprising that
most Afghans prefer to rely on local customary justice systems over the
state justice system.
For women, these universal dangers are compounded by cultural
norms that prevent women from traveling outside of their homes alone.
This is particularly detrimental because women as a group have the
most to gain from access to the state justice system. Although the
Afghan justice system has been criticized by Western scholars as
discriminatory to women, it nonetheless is a vast improvement over the
customary justice systems, which shut women out entirely. The norms
that prevent women from traveling alone mean that a woman who
wants a divorce, a remedy not available under traditional Afghan law, 129
must either ask her husband or another male relative to accompany her
to the courthouse or face extreme danger by attempting to make the trip
herself. As a result, most rural women are cut off from the few legal
remedies afforded to them under Afghan and Islamic law by their
inability to access the state justice system that could provide those
remedies.
The danger and difficulty of traveling in rural areas not only
hampers the ability of rural residents to get to the courts, but it also
hinders the smooth functioning of the courts. Many judges and
prosecutors in rural areas go without payment for months at a time not
as the result of a lack of funds, but rather because there is no safe way
124. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2011).
125. See FEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 46.
126. Id. at 48.
127. Id. at 46-47.
128. See id. at 46-48.
129. See Fatima Gailani, Human Rights in Afghanistan: Law and Reality, in THE RULE
OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 144, 148 (Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000).
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to deliver payment.130 The situation created by a lack of payment for
months, and low payment when it does arrive creates fertile ground for
corruption.13 Provincial judges also have little to no access to legal
texts, and therefore make decisions largely without reference to the
law. 132 Finally, there is little to no monitoring of provincial courts, and
visitors to the provinces have reported little to no activity at certain
courthouses.s33 Thus, rural Afghans face the possibility of making a long
and dangerous trip to the nearest court, only to discover that the court
is not in operation.
The solution to the difficulty of traveling in rural Afghanistan is
simple to state but difficult to actually implement. The Afghan
government and the NATO forces in Afghanistan must secure the
country against independent armed forces and disable or safely
detonate the landmines that litter the countryside. Defeating or
disarming the Taliban and other independent militias terrorizing the
Afghan people is easier said than done and remains the focus of most of
the international community's current efforts in Afghanistan. However,
a strong, coordinated effort to disarm or safely detonate landmines
would probably have a positive impact far beyond its military benefits.
Countrywide, rural Afghans report that their access to pastureland is
most negatively impacted by the presence of landmines.134 Therefore, a
program to eradicate land mines would not only increase the ability of
Afghans to access courts, medical clinics, and schools, but would also
increase their access to livelihoods other than poppy production. Finally,
such a program would also generate good will on the part of the
populace, something that cannot be given too much weight in a war that
is being fought "in the hearts and minds" of Afghans as well as on the
battlefield.
The secondary effects of the danger on the roads must also be
addressed. Every effort should be made to ensure that judges get paid
regularly and are supplied with the basic legal materials necessary for
them to administer the law. A judiciary with inadequate resources is
more likely to decide cases on the basis of external pressure, corruption,
and intimidation. 35 Adequate and regular pay will greatly decrease the
incentives to take bribes and will at least provide judges with financial
independence from local power brokers. Corruption and allegiance to
local power brokers among judges leave little incentive for rural
130. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 18, at 20.
131. See ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 7, at 7.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See FEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 46.
135. STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 122, at 240.
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Afghans to seek relief from the state justice system rather than from
their own customary legal systems. Lack of basic legal resources such as
legal codes and higher court decisions has a two-fold effect on the
judiciary; it leads judges to make decisions without reference to the law,
and it can "undermine respect for the judiciary both in the judges' own
eyes and in the eyes of the public." 36
Finally, the difficulty that Afghan citizens have in getting to the
courts could be solved by having the courts come to them. Mobile court
systems have been used with success in refugee camps in Kenya and
Zambia. 37 In Afghanistan, a mobile court system could also solve the
problem of judges being co-opted by regional power brokers. If judges do
not remain in one area for long, and if they are guarded the entire time
they are in that area, it will be more difficult for regional warlords and
commanders to bribe or intimidate them. Judges will also be less likely
to develop biases for or against prominent members of the community in
each region.
CONCLUSION
The rule of law is a universal good, necessary for everything from
freedom, to democracy, to economic stability. 38 But most Afghan
citizens today do not live under a rule of law regime. While laws exist,
in the sense that they have been codified, very few judges know the laws
and fewer still apply them. The success of the current international
military presence in Afghanistan will be measured by the country's
stability after the military leaves. Stability cannot exist in a country
that does not live under the rule of law.
Afghanistan will never have a rule of law society until the seventy-
five percent of its population that lives in rural areas has access to the
state institutions that administer the law. Currently, physical,
practical, and cultural obstacles prevent the vast majority of Afghans
from accessing those systems. In order for the rule of law to prevail in
Afghanistan, the judiciary and police must be taught about the law and
trained in how to administer it. Both institutions must be purged of
corruption and protected from the influences of powerful warlords and
136. Id. at 241.
137. See UNHCR, GLOBAL REPORT 2007 - ZAMBIA 289 (noting that mobile courts have
been particularly effective at protecting the rights of rape and abuse survivors); UNHCR,
OPERATIONAL PROTECTION IN CAMPS AND SETTLEMENTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE OF GOOD
PRACTICES IN THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND OTHER PERSONS OF CONCERN, at All-
A12 (2006).
138. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAw: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THEORY 2
(2004); Kleinfeld, supra note 3, at 31-32.
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politicians. Rural Afghans must be able to get to the state courthouses
and utilize the court system. These goals are not impossible, but in
order for them to be accomplished, they require commitment and
coordination from the international community and the government of
Afghanistan.
